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STRICT LIABILITY
Francisco Bonet Ram6n*
PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS
The etymological origin of the term "liability" is perhaps to be
found in the sacrosanct formulae of the Roman stipulatio, wherein
the most frequently used phrase (sponaesme?, spondeo) gave rise to
the obligation on the part of the person summoned to respond in an
abstract way to the cause.' This traditional term, which continuously
pervades all activities stemming from human relations and the entire
legal system, has many facets and meanings.2
Under the first aspect, and especially in an ordinary sense, the
term "liability" refers to the power and unescapable duty to choose
the proper conduct according to the rules, or norms, and precepts
that, in spite of the persistent fallibility of the opinion establishing
such conduct, presupposes a more or less perfect observance and ex-
ecution. At this point, one must set aside the notion of liability for
the violation of behavioral norms in the broad sense and concentrate
on the notion of liability that consists of the duty and, consequently,
the personal risk that each individual participant runs in relation to
the events that are, more or less, conceivable according to the law
of causality.
"To hold liable" or "to have a sense of owning up" are expres-
sions that can be used in referring to this first notion of liability,
taking into consideration the means of prediction and prevention in
regard to the probable consequences of our conduct, which means arise
from that refined sense of foresight and calculation that comes with
mental maturity and experience. To have to respond, in the end, to
the more or less imputable fault is liability in the proper sense, a
definite and consistent notion, appearing as an element on which to
base the direction of our conduct and constituting our duty at each
moment and, at the same time, our most important attribute.
Fear of liability and blind temerity exist in the greatest extreme.
There are individuals who have so strong a hedonistic tendency that
it becomes a morosity that converts it into true paranoia, thus there
are those whose unbalanced and impulsive state surpass temerity. In
* Justice, Supreme Court of Spain; Professor of Law, University Complutense
of Madrid; President, First Section of the General Commission on Codification.
1. Pellegrini, Responsabilitd, 5 Nuovo DIGESTO ITALIANO 438 (1939) [hereinafter
cited as Pellegrini].
2. Bonet Ram6n & Bonet Bonet, Responsabilidad civil nuclear, 5 ESTUDIOS DE
DERECHO CIVIL EN HONOR DEL PROF. CASTAN 56 (1969).
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between the extremes, there is the person summoned to liability who
is able to face, with open eyes and firm courage, the unavoiadable
obstacles in order to achieve the greatest goal.
Under a different and more correct use, liability in general con-
sists of the duty to respond in the presence of another individual for
the violation of any established or presumed behavioral norm and to
suffer the pre-established sanctions.' Liability is classified by the
.category of violated norms. The purely religious and the moral norms,
respectively, produce religious responsibility before God and his
ministers and moral responsibility before public opinion and esteem.
Certainly in an ideal world, such as the Christian one, the two extra-
legal sanctions should be sufficient, being enough, also, to maintain
the collective material order. If the individual will, which is supposed
to conform to the moral norms and also to Christian precepts, would
do so, there would be no need for the juridical norm. The punitive
sanction would, likewise, be reduced to remorse of the conscience,
which would be capable of determining the correct proportion bet-
ween the transgression and the sanction and could, perhaps, overcome
it. But, according to universal and enduring experience, man creates
his own ideal world where hedonistic motives are predominantely ac-
tive and bring harm to his neighbors; therefore, the juridical norm
must also be active and, by it, legal responsibility is determined and
measured.
The juridical norm, with its imperative and correlatively per-
missive components, allows for so many other possibilities in which
the individual acts with much power and freedom that this is actual-
ly what is referred to as subjective law-the juridical situation or
position. Since this conceptually brings about the impossibility of an
integrated coexistence of two laws of equal rank, to exceed the ideal
limits implies an illicit act, which is an injury in the broad sense (quod
non jura lit) and generates liability-that which is in essence resolved
in a new obligation, one that is reflected and converted, giving rise
to whatever is necessary in order to return to the situation existing
prior to the injury. But, since this is never possible, because, at least,
the illicit act has transatorily and irrecoverably infringed upon the
other law, there is a need for the sanction, which is legal restitution.
On the basis of such premises it can be concluded that the injury
necessarily and exclusively implies a violation of another individual's
right that is operative on the same level. So it was in the primitive
and rudimental system where the injury necessarily and exclusively
3. In addition, the same term is used to distinguish and designate one of the
elements of the perfect civil obligation (Haftung) and in contradistinction to the debt
(Schuld), according to Brinz's theory that creates the possibility of such a separation.
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implied an offense to the person, who initially reacted with the fullness
of free will, without giving any attention to the magnitude of the of-
fense or to the fault of the individual, but who afterwards became
restrained by the progressive notion of justice and the law, which
reconciled and adapted the interest of the individual with respect to
the community.' Therefore, there arose the right, and usually the duty,
of the victim to seek protection and restoration. The thrust of liabili-
ty at this point was directed only at the private reparation of the
offense.
But, the illicit act assumes and will always have diverse and broad
facets, because of its intensity as well as its definite irreparability,
even when it disturbs and offends only the collective security. It was
in this way that the notion of delict came to operate when the in-
jured right was that of the state, as the supreme sovereign and pro-
tector of the security of the society.
The definitions of liability are numerous and vary according the
many components and fundamental sources that one takes into ac-
count, such as those of civil responsibility or liability for damage, of
extra-contractual fault or aquilian fault, of strict liability, of illicit acts,
of damage and indemnification for damage, etc. A multitude of similar
notions and expressions can be found in the theories of the more
developed legal systems. We find in French doctrine discussions of
delicts and quasi-delicts, illicit acts, fault, and responsibility; in Ger-
man doctrine, Haftung, Schuldhaftung, Schadenersatzrecht, and Haitp-
fichtrecht; and in the common law countries, torts, liability, strict
liability, responsibility, etc.
Within the same legislative language one finds, in this regard, an
unusual mixing and combining of definitions. Thus, although the codes
in general terms have adopted the notion of illicit acts, they then
specifically treat the indemnification for the illicit act (dolus, or culpa,
or sin culpa), or damaging act, or the damage occasioned, or the liabili-
ty for the damage caused, etc.' This concurrence of distinct concepts
reveals, on first impression, the symptom and, at the same time, the
effect of the theoretic difficulty with respect to the basis and nature
of the phenomenon. Any conscientious person must be aware of the
necessity of moving away from a notion that evades the many sug-
gestions offered in various ways by idealogical criteria or by empirical
elements for the establishment of a valid point of reference in order
to satisfactorily structure the material. It is in light of an intuitive
4. I G. CHIRONI & L. ABELLO, TRATTATO DI DIRITTO CIVILE 509 et seq. (1904).
5. Paper presented by Francisco Bonet Ram6n, Perspectivas de la responsabilidad
civil: Estudio de Derecho comparado, Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislaci6n
(Madrid, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Bonet Ram6n].
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fusion, of a unitary synthesis, that the "submission to the unfavorable
consequences of one's conduct" must exist. The classification of "civil"
is suitable for establishing a safe way to refer to liability within the
realm of the rigid relations within private law.
Broadly speaking, it can be said that any investigation that pur-
poses to delineate a rather penetrating and definite representation
of the subject must adhere to the analysis of the notion of liability,
in its general characteristics as well as the meanings that flow from
the various areas of reality.' In principle, the notion expresses an
essential importance in the nature of man, the conditioning of his
freedom to act, which operates in order to prevent it from being
transformed into abuse, according to the well-determined rules directed
at punishing its means and the consequences. From this it can be con-
cluded that liability can take on many meanings and connotations
depending upon the values and the laws that are taken into account
in each situation.
Its primitive manifestation, even though that is too elevated for
its immediate connection with the human condition, is injected into
the realm of the moral, where it acts as the measure of actions taken
according to the standard of judgment constituted by the universal
conscience, which is inspired by a consideration for the Supreme Being.
It is here that one is confronted with the many other absolute im-
peratives that demand obedience, with disregard for any considera-
tions of convenience. Thus, the voluntary infraction of the law results
in all cases in an affirmation of "guilt," which has already found its
sanction in the remorse and disturbance of the spirit, and the same
responsibility is born and exhausted within the sphere of values and
within the ambit of reactions principally relating to the inner life of
man.
Alternatively, a distinct examination, and one of major importance,
must be undertaken with respect to the realm of those criteria and
rules that the collective conscience, an expression and at the same
time a matrix of values constantly being received from society, pro-
poses in regard to the behavior of men in the life of relations. With
a rather loose orientation, one can discuss, here, reality and moral
principles, in the sense that they originate from man and are aimed
at explaining his freedom to act, but with an awareness that one often
confines himself to morality having a social content and which, in ef-
fect, is created according to the reasons and ideal goals to which the
6. Concerning the meaning and diverse applications of the notion of liability, con-
pare S. RODOTA, IL PROBLEMA DELLA RESPONSABILITA CIVILE 40 et-seq. (1964) [hereinafter
cited as RODOTAJ; Bagolini, Responsabilitd e analisi del linguagio, 12 REVISTA TRIMESTRALE
Di DMRITTO E PROCEDURA CIVILE 592 et seq. (1958); Pellegrini, supra n. 1, at 438 et seq.
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actions of joint participants ought to conform. In itself, this means
that the concept of morality most frequently employed by experts,
and more or less consciously by the jurists, presents itself principally
to determine or set those criteria and elements that must be taken
into consideration in all matters concerning positive norms.' For this
purpose, the acts of man have value, then, not only for their intrinsic
significance, but also for the extrinsic results which they produce. To
the same effect, they determine the criteria and fundamental rules
to which man's conduct ought to conform, among which it is wise to
point out the one particularly relevant to the purposes of this study-
that of the alterum non laedere' Corresponding to those criteria is
the affirmation of responsibility on the part of an individual who, act-
ing so as to injure others, thereby breaches a duty, which not only
gives rise to a motive for reprobation, but also imposes a positive
duty of reparation.
This other view of the phenomenon becomes evident when one
considers only the sphere of social reality. Here one encounters the
regulations that men give to themselves in order to realize the goals
that are essential to the life of the group, within which individual
liberty, always constituting a factor and an indispensible coefficient,
is identified and specialized by means of the rules worthy of serving
to discipline and coordinate its manifestations in view of the stead-
fast objective of the peace and solidarity of the group. From this
perspective, one can consider anew the situation in which an act by
man causes harm to the general interests or to those deserving pro-
tection; thus, under this view one can define "civil delict" as a mean-
ingful and sufficiently exact expression. In confronting the delict, the
social order reacts by establishing distinct types of remedies accord-
ing to the means available, taking into account the impact that the
offense has for the injured party and according to an examination
of the nature of the offense, considering the objective of achieving
the best means of restoring the injured interests. Thus, one can now
draw a rather precise image of the nature and actual foundation of
responsibility in the "fault of the individual who caused the harm and
in the correlative subjection to the established purpose of responding
7. Bonet Ram6n, stepra. n. 5, at 52. Contemporary thinking attributes a peculiar
structure to the moral principles with respect to the normative construction and ap-
plication of liability. See L. HUSSON, LES TRANSFORMATIONS DE LA RESPONSABILITE: ETuDE
SUR LA PENSEE JURIIUQUE 329 (1947); 1 H. MAZEAUD, L. MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, TRAIT
THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESI'ONSADIIoITE CIVIlE. DI.IICTUELIE ET CONTRACTUEILE 3
(6th ed. 1965) 1hereinafter cited as I MAZEAUD, MAZEAUD & TUNCI; G. RII'ERT, LA RtGIE
MORALE DANS LES OBiIGATIONS CIVIIs 218 (1949) (hereinafter cited as RIPERTI; Williams,
The Aims of the Low of' To-tIs, in IV CURRENT LEGAL. PROmx.MS 140 (1951).
8. For a comparison of the content and general understanding of that principle,
see Pugliatti, Alterno,. non aedere in II ENCIC!,OPEDIA iEI0 DiRIrT(o 98 el seq. (1958).
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to the delict with an adequate reaction."' This definition, moreover,
constitutes a valid and meaningful point of departure toward arriv-
ing at the configuration of responsibility within the scope and mean-
ing of the law as a basic ordering of social relations.
In this atomic and space age in which we live, there corresponds
in the juridical world the age of civil responsibility. Just as rights
are born from acts, ex facto oritur jus, the Roman law noxal action
gives rise to the "atomic action" of our day and, in regard to the
content of liability, the reparation of material damage exclusively has
been extended to moral damages as well. In this respect, one must
look to the most recent reasons for the development of civil liability
and its perspectives: the enormous diffusion of damage-causing
events-which in large part are independent of the "culpable" act of
man, appearing to be strictly connected to the risks created by social
and technological progress-events that are encountered in the grow-
ing extension of fundamental reasons for the obligation of restora-
tion. From this is derived the increasingly frequent resort to the use
of insurance as a remedy, with important practical repercussions in
the evolution of liability for damages.
The assumption of one's own risks and those of others under cer-
tain conditions guides the direction of activities, such as that of plan-
ning for the future, so essential in our time, and flourishes in the
economic and social order and in the legal world in institutions and
important devices such as those of insurance. This is why, as Benitez
deLugo observes,'" we cannot hope to eliminate the risks that accom-
pany the life of man, that destroy his patrimony and his hopes and
frustrate his plans for the future; man can only assume the burden
of the economic consequences of those risks which, when they occur,
come under the heading of sinister. We anticipate that risk is the
eventuality of an occurrence, of an act which is uncertain, whether
it is because of the possibility that it may or may not occur (uncer-
tain) or because of the uncertainty as to when it will occur (certain
risk), but in all cases a harm, a wrong of some kind must be suffered.
Risks are limited in number, but are constantly increasing; damage-
causing events brought about by persons as well as things intensify
mith the aid of natural forces, such as energy and machines, that
multiply in what we call industrial civilization. At this point, without
a doubt, the most important characteristic for contemporary society
is, precisely, security."
9. See Scognamiglio, Responsabilitd civile, 15 NovissiMo DIGESTO ITALIANO 633
(1968).
10. I B. DE LUGO & L. REYMUNDO, TRATADO DE SEGUROS 5 (1955).
11. M. I. Tocino Biscarolasaga, Riesgo y daho nuclear de las centrales nucleares
106 (doctoral thesis, July 6, 1973).
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GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Definitely civil responsibility must ordinarily be understood as the
subjection to an obligation, 2 the submission to a sanction,'3 the obliga-
tion to repair damage, 4 the link which supports the consequences that
the law attributes to a particular harm-causing act, etc.'"
All of these formulations, as RodotA points out, are limited to
describing a situation already complete in its elements from a legal
point of view and, consequently, to which the concept of liability adds
nothing. In effect, when one speaks of subjection to an obligation one
does nothing more than explain a datum that is already present in
that same concept of the obligation, and, when reference is made to
a link, to paraphrase Rodota, it is limited to the definition of the obliga-
tion; no greater force can serve to identify liability with the obliga-
tion of reparation, this applying as well to the submission to a sanc-
tion. In other words, the concept of liability in those instances is no
different from the obligation revealed by any other definition which,
in attempting to introduce an element of greater clarity, perceives
in civil responsibility the obligation to compensate for the damage
caused to another by the person responsible for that damage,'" which
actually begs the question.
Precisely, what remains unexpressed in all of those formulae is
the relations between liability and damage to a person, and between
the liability and obligation of the other person, that is, the relevant
juridical consequences of the damage and the ways of imposing the
obligation. To say that an individual is legally responsible does not
always mean the same thing as saying that the individual was the
perpetrator of the harmful act which he is called to repair. In other
words, attributing liability in a juridical sense does not consist of the
mere reproduction of an actual fact, nor of the imputation of fault
for the damage on the basis of a comparative evaluation of the in-
terests by determining a criterion as a result of which the spontaneous
attribution of the damage can be substituted with a juridical one. 8
12. A. CANDIAN, NOZIONI ISTITUZIONAL DI DIRITTO PRIVATO 167-68 (1960); S. PUGLIAT.
TI, GLI ISTITUTI DEL DIRITTO CIVILE 246 (1943).
13. D. RUBINO, LA RESPONSABILITA PATRIMONIALE 6 (1956).
14. H. LALOU, TRAITE PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE 3 (1955).
15. Carnelutti, Responsabilitd e qiudizio, 13 RIVISTA )1 DIRITTO PROCESSUALE CIVILE
1-13 (1958).
16. RODOTA, supra n. 6, at 72.
17. PETIT DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT, s.V. "Responsabilitd civile" (1951).
18. This is not only used ;n referring to those cases where it is impossible to
impute the damage to a person other than the victim, the damage ultimately being
borne by the victim, but also to all situations (in the broad sense, those related to
the organized forms of the security of society), where the mere fact of the damage
serves to determine who is liable and thus obligated to make reparation by reason
of a relationship to the particular act.
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This juridical method of attributing an obligation to an individual is
not necessarily conditioned upon the existence of that individual's
freedom of choice; that question arises only when one wishes to resolve
the particular problem of determining who the perpetrator of a cer-
tain act was, not when someone simply takes on the burden of the
obligation of repairing the damaging consequences.
The transition of the criterion from ethical to legal is expressed
in the maxim "no one is liable unless he is liable in fact."'9 And, precise-
ly because such an attribution will remove the consequences of the
damage caused by an individual, which is the most obvious
characteristic of civil liability-already suitable in order to differen-
tiate structurally the moral or penal-it is transformed at this point
into a relational concept."0 To say that there is always a responsible
person to bear the damage ' is only a partial truth, in the sense that
bearing the damage ought to indicate simply the obligation to repair
the damage suffered by a third party. From another standpoint, this
presents a formulation that is not only contradictory to the principles
discussed up to this point, but also to that part of the juridical
discipline which views the assessment of liability as an intersubjec-
tive relation (classifying illicit acts among the sources of obligations).
In effect, regardless of which concept of damage is considered, its
legal relevance will always depend upon the possibility of acknowledg-
ing a criterion that allows one to attribute responsibility to an in-
dividual; in the absence of such a possibility, the damage-causing event
remains purely an act within nature.
The result of this can be indicated as follows: damage-causing
event, liability, obligation to repair, with the determination of liabili-
ty being, at a time, a condition of the juridical relevance of the damage-
causing event (because of its classification as illicit) and the motive
being its link to the individual who is determined to be responsible.
Proof of this can be found in the area of those elements that are tradi-
tionally listed as being illicit motives, when one considers that an in-
dividual can be said to have caused damage only after it has been
determined that he is responsible; and one finds reflected in the signifi-
cant classification of the particular damage-causing as unjust, which
substantially means nothing more than saying that the damage in itself
is unjust, that it is only an ex post facto reference to a particular in-
dividual in order to make him liable. Thus, certain jurists see the
19. B. CROCE, ETICA E POLITICA (1945); F. LOMBARDI. IL CONCETTO DI RESPONSABILITA
7 (unknown); Paci, La responsabilitd e la storia, in ESISTENZIALISMO E STOIICISMO 193-209
(1950).
20. Pugliatti, Autoresponsabilitd, in IV ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 453 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Pugliattil.
21. 11 L. JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF FRANCAIS 235 (1939).
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autonomy of civil responsibility as a "subjective state," or a "juridical
situation" or "position."2
Commonly it has been observed that the imputation of fault
resolves itself into a double consideration: the phenomenological or
historical in regard to the behavior, the deontological, because from
it can be deduced the necessity that the individual bear the conse-
quences of an act.23 And to change to a different point of view has
no constructive consequences. The most exact approach seems to be
that the foundation of civil liability should not be sought in extra-
juridical references, such as justice or social interests, nor, logically,
in an illicit act from the time of the offense's classification, a time
when there has been no predetermination of liability. The foundation
of liability is in the juridical act, the act that causes the damage, which
is thus a unitary element. On the other hand, the criteria by which
imputation of such acts to a particular individual is accomplished are
quite numerous." It is therefore incorrect, as is often done, to perceive
in the concept of civil liability only the subjective responsibility for
an illicit act. By the term civil liability, as Bonvicini points out," one
finds, on the other hand, that the obligatory performance, which arises
because of the consequences of the damage-causing act, must be borne
by the individual, whether or not the act is imputable to the pre-
judiced, or injured, individual. The various compositional tendencies
of the features and scope of civil responsibility, nevertheless, serve
to delineate, within the context of its theoretic evolution, and to of-
fer sufficient principles and elements for the purpose of constructing
a valid and clear understanding of the concept.
The focal point of doctrinal discussions always alternates between
the principle of liability for fault (culpa) and that referred to as objec-
tive, legal (strict), or social liability. As Scognamiglio points out," the
traditional, and still current, theory maintains that the fundamental,
as well as the unique, feature of liability is found in the element of.
fault (culpa), understood in the subjective sense of the psychological
participation in negligent behavior, even though the manner in which
it is accomplished, according to an objective standard or, to the con-
trary, in accordance with a more developed opinion, refers to the
breach of a rule of behavior. One can confirm that under the
proposition -that all the suggestions from the moral and common con-
science are, in a sense, aimed at protecting man's freedom to act-it
22. A. LEVi, TEORIA GENERALE DEL DntrTo 388 (1953).
23. Pugliatti, supra n. 20, at 452.
24. RODOTA, supra n. 6, at 78.
25. E. BONVICINI, LA RESPONSABILITA PER I DANNI NEL DIRITTO DELLE OBBLIGAZIONI
39 (1963) [hereinafter cited as BONVICINI].
26. Id. at 634 et seq.
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is just and appropriate to allow the burden of reparation for damage
to fall on the person who has engaged in culpable behavior. It is true
that history seems to indicate that at a certain stage of evolution legal
systems are induced to abandon the excessively unrefined and im-
puricle criteria concerning the mere causation of damage in order to
recognize in the determination of fault the fundamental basis and limit
of liability.' Yet, there is no lack of other constructive and distinct
theories that lead to the same result, or that proclaim a technio-legal
notion of fault, by which the instances of liability known as objective
or strict can be understood in its many dimensions, in whole or in
part,"8 or that, according to a particular view, always finds the source
of liability in fault, without recognizing, on the other hand, the diver-
sity of criteria that can result from the growth of the concept,' or
that, by another method and means of limitation, they can restrict
themselves to those types of liability that are most repugnant to the
notion of fault and in which a different notion of security is refined.'
In all these approaches there is a tendency that always seems
to be dominant, preferring to reaffirm the ideal superiority of the
principle of fault in which, whenever possible: the other types of liabili-
ty should have reference-so that the criteria for the shifting of the
burden of proof can be understood-but allowing recourse to the fun-
damentally different types of liability only in exceptional cases." The
concept referred to, as Scognamiglio observes, in its principal prop-
ositions and in the component intricacies which it encompasses, en-
counters many penetrating criticisms. It can be seen that the reference
to fault as the indestructible basis and essential element of liability
27. See especially T. BRASIELLO, I LIMITI DELILA RESPONSABILITA PER DANNI, 3 et seq.
(1959); G. CESAREO-CONSOLO, TRATTATO SUL RISARCIMENTO DEL DANNO, 5 et seq. (1908); I
G. CHIRON], LA COLPA EXTRACONTRATTUALE 54 et seq. (1903); I A. DE CuPIs, .DANNO, 113
et seq. (1966); V. LITZ, DIE DELIKTS-OBIICATIONEM I et seq. (1899); 1 MAZEAUD, MAZEAUD
& TUNC, supra n. 7; RIPERT, supra n. 7, at 199, 211; II A. VON TuHR, DER ALIEGMEINE
TElL DES DEUTSCQIN BURGERLICHEN RECIITS, 481 (1918); Planiol, Etudes sur la responsabilitg
civile, 34 REVU.., JRITIQUE DE LGISIATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 277 (1905).
28. See, e.g., I MAZEAUD. MAZEAUD & TUNC, supra. n. 7, at 470, 486; II H. MAZEAUD,
L. MAZEAUD & A. TUNC, TRAT[ THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVIIE, 329
et seq. (6th ed. 1965) (wherein the notion characteristic of "fault in custody" is proposed
with regard to liability for the acts of things or animals); F. SCHREIER, SCHULD AND
UNRECHT? (1935); Cascio, Osservazioni critiche sulla, leoria della reisponsabilitd in CIROCIO
GIURIDIco 85 et seq. (1937).
29. II D. BARBERO, SISTEMA DEL DMRITTO PRIVATO ITALIANO 815 et seq. (6th ed. 1962);
Barbero, Criterio di nascita e criteri di propaqazione della, responsabiiltd per .rtto it-
tecito, I RIVISTA Di DiRITTO CIVILE 572 et seq. (1960).
30. Comp re B. STARCK, ESSAI D'UNE THEORIE GENERALE DE LA RESPONSARILI'TE (1947).
31. II L. BARASSI, LA TEORIA GENERALE DELLE OBRIIGAZIONI 422, 474 et seq. (2d ed.
1964) Ihereinafter cited as BARASS1]; I ft. SAVATIER, TRAITE DE LA RESPONSARII.ITE 354
(1951) (hereinafter cited as SAVATIER].
32. SAVATIER, supra n. 31, at 635.
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is more a myth than anything else, and this is also true of the many
other preconceptions of liability that appear as reasons from the moral
or logical order and as suggestions from historical experience adduced
to support that myth.3 In particular, there is not one logico-juridical
necessity that can be adduced to establish an identity, which in reali-
ty does not exist, between the notions of responsibility and fault. In
this, where, at first glance, the correct approach appears to be the
opinion according to which fault constitutes an element principally
derived from the content of the subjective aspects of the obligation
to repair, which the legislator correspondingly determines, primarily
on the basis of presumed just or moral reasons, and which, for the
remainder, is presented by the same social conscience, in various ways,
during the course of historical evolution and according to the criteria
and elements of liability other than those of fault. To maintain that
the development of the law progresses according to a path required
by the relevance of fault is a clear falsification of historical experience
which rests upon a conveniently presumed notion.
On the level of the aspects that have a properly dogmatic
character, it can be observed that the notion of fault, properly
understood, indicates only a specific subjective element of the act
(damage) from which many controversies concerning its nature and
significance arise and that, for the purpose of arriving at a complete
definition of the phenomenon, one must refer to the many forms-
which give rise to the ultimate problems-of illicit fault. To the harsh-
est objections, on the other hand, tentative descriptions of the notion
that are manifested in order to give reasons in regard to fault for
the normative categories articulated on the basis of the diverse
criteria. Thus, one can say that, when there is a recognition of ex-
onerating proof of a negative content, it is possible to establish a sim-
ple presumption of fault or to make reference, when such proof is
not permitted, to an absolute presumption (of fault), which means
following an artificial and preconceived method for arbitrarily
substituting fictitious data for the actual circumstances and that, when
one takes into consideration the ambiguities and the errors in con-
struction and interpretation that can occur, such a method must be
abandoned."
On the other hand, to adduce with the same effect a technical
notion of legal fault constitutes only a partial remedy-it does not
seem possible, for example, to explain in this way the liability of
33. See generally RODOTA, supra n. 6, at 8 et seq. and the bibliography provided
therein.
34. For a thorough criticism of the recourse in this matter to the presumptions
of fault, compare BARASSI, supra n. 31, at 488; P. TRIMARCIU, RiSCHIO E RESPONSABIIITA
OGGETTIVA, 21 et seq. (1961) [hereinafter cited as TRIMARCHI].
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fathers for the acts of their sons or of employers for the acts of their
workers-and it even represents a manifestly sterile solution as soon
as one recognizes that it repudiates the realistic notion of fault and
substitutes for it a formalistic and surreptitious notion simply for the
sake of conceptual convenience. Likewise, the distinction between those
criteria concerning the origin and growth of the concept seems to con-
stitute a pure expediente by which to reconcile the ideal thesis, which
maintains that the foundation of liability must always be found in the
fault, with the recognition that ulterior motives come into play within
the opposing hypotheses. Finally, one must discard a preconceived
and arbitrary approach which, even after alleviating all the difficulties,
puts forth the distinct notion of warranty, which is conducive to cer-
tain types of liability that do not possibly seem to be founded on fault.
At this point, and to recapitulate, it seems reasonable to agree
with Scognamiglio35 that fault does not constitute an essential basis
of liability in all cases, in that such an approach represents only an
act of allegiance to traditional ideology; on the other hand, there is
some danger in attributing to such a criterion a fundamental or, as
it may be, principal value from the category of the types of obliga-
tions to repair. Contractual liability could be defined, as Bonvicini
does,3" to mean the juridical situation of the debtor, who has the task
of guarantying-with his own patrimony-the creditor of the perfor-
mance by indemnifying him for the equivalent of the passive economic
consequences of the damage, insofar as they can be legally calculated,
caused to a thing as the result of the non-performance of an agreed-
upon obligation. Within the realm of the extra-contractual, liability
can be defined as the juridical situation recognizing a burden on the
part of an individual who has the task of assuring protection by in-
demnification in an amount equal to the passive economic consequences
of the harm, insofar as it can be legally calculated, to the thing belong-
ing to another as a result of conduct that is considered illicit by the
legal order.
The traditional system of no liability without fault did not pre-
tend to provide reparation in all situations where damage existed,
but offered only the possibility of restitution for damages caused by
the voluntary behavior of an individual. Other contemplated situations
were considered as mere exceptions. All of this constitutes a point
of view natural to an economy characterized by relatively modest
change and by an absence of any appreciable technical devices. One
must not forget that such notions were heavily influenced by the con-
cept of ownership, which was substantially linked to a static view
35. TRIMARCI I, supra n. 34, at 636.
36. BONVICINI, supra n. 25, at 39.
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of property. Even before that, in regard to ideological considerations,
the new reality of the instances of damage fell within considerations
having an objective character; afterwards, the change in quality of
damage, more than the increase in the already existing possibilities,
affected the many instances which emerged and were promptly
destined to prevail over the existing ones. The harmful event in those
areas characterized by progress was not so much the result of blind
fatility, as of an adverse destiny that impeded the anticipation of the
occurrence of damage, a fact that usually accompanies the works of
man, remaining, nevertheless, divorced from the traditional configura-
tion of the element of the will, because it concerns damage that must
occur.
For its part, the means by which this inevitable occurrence can
be verified render useless the criteria employed in attaching the
damaging act to a particular individual; in that sense, one can cor-
rectly conclude (by referring to those criteria which constitute the
usual approach) that, in that which always relates most directly to
industrial and technical factors, it becomes difficult to tell who caused
the damage, thus rendering the delict, in a sense, anonymous. 7
It is precisely because certain damages must occur and be
"anonymous" that the traditional deterrent and retributive feature
of the obligation to repair becomes inadequate, from which there ex-
clusively emerges the view of reparation that likewise has repercus-
sions in those cases where the obligation is the consequence of a
damage attributable to the category of fault. Shifting attention from
the perpetrator of the damage to the victim is not only the pursuit
of an ever detectable requirement of security, but also the inevitable
consequence of a situation in which the search for a material thing
or person that caused the damage very frequently runs the risk of
producing no results.
To point out the major dangers to which modern society in par-
ticular is exposed and to indicate the growing necessity for protec-
tion is to state the obvious, but incomplete. In effect, no social order
has ever made use of devices for protecting the individual comparable
to those presently being used, and in a manner whose actual result
covers a more extensive area than did those in a less menacing era
protected by the traditional discipline of civil liability. If one can allude
to the great need for security, it can be said that a well-organized
society cannot tolerate that a damage go unrepaired simply because
37. Accidents known as industrial or mechanical came to be of the "anonymous"
type. L. JOSSERAND, DE IA ItESIONSAIIITIAT DU FAIT DES CUOSES INANIMES 7 (1897)
[hereinafter cited as JOSSERAND]; G. RIPERT, LE REGIME I)MOCRATI(JUE ET IE DRoIT CIVIl,
MODERNE 307 (1948).
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it is difficult or impossible, giving of course the obvious excuses, to
identify its perpetrator; but, one must be impartial in stating that
such a great need for security is derived only from the most frequent
occasions of damage, although it is true, on the other hand, that the
need is due to the state's strongest demands for the welfare of its
subjects. Those damages suffered, but ignored by the law, in the past
today provoke the reaction of the juridical order.38 Those damages
caused by the voluntary behavior of the individual, due to a fortuitous
event or force majeure have required for their reparation the crea-
tion and recognition of a new source of civil responsibility, called strict
or social liability, which will be examined more closely in the follow-
ing section.
GuIDING PRINCIPLES
The notion of force majeure (or fortuitous event) as the external
limit of fault, and thus of civil liability, has given rise to the so-called
strict liability, Which has as its necessary base the absence of the
subjective element of fault or negligence. It must be understood,
however, that the notion of force majeure or fortuitous event is not
always the correlative of the notion of fault. Force majeure establishes,
respectively, the limits of (and obviously in a number of ways) the
cases of liability with fault and those where fault does not form its
basis-the so-called strict liability. One can also maintain under the
category of objective liability the distinction between relatively ob-
jective liability (where one must consider force majeure, that is, the
external limit of liability) and absolute objective liability (that is, liabili-
ty where the person is responsible even in the event of force majeure).
However, one must consider for the sake of convenience that the
notion of strict liability includes all cases in which the element of fault
or negligence, as set forth in article 1902 of the C6digo civil, are ab-
sent. In that way the discussion can essentially be limited to those
cases of (strict) liability where fault is not a basis. Doctrine, normally
distinguishing only between "subjective liability" and "objective liabili-
ty," creates great confusion in its reference to the concept of fault,
which it presents in the most uncertain terms (taking into account
even the minimum requisites of that concept) and this reference is
made in such a way that any particular type of liability can fall into
either one or the other category (subjective or objective), because of
the very diverse and sometimes contradictory points of view employed.
The discriminating criterion that is supposed to maintain subjective
liability within rather ample boundaries is that which lies in the op-
portunity (given to the defendant by the law) of proving the existence
38. RoDOTA, supra n. 6, at 23-24.
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of force majoure (fortuitous event) and particularly the "inevitability
of the damage," considering this as "proof of the absence of fault,"
from which it is deduced that in those cases fault is the basis of liabili-
ty. But, setting aside the fact that evitability (with emphasis on
foreseeability) is tied to fault, it is clear that it is possible to prove
a circumstance (different from fault) that is sufficient to establish a
limit between liability and the absence of liability, which indicates
that fault in such cases is not a consideration, although undoubtedly
it concerns a questio' of liability, and such liability cannot be called
anything other than strict, while the law itself in the same situation
establishes rationales and fixes limits, which are different in each case.
The equivocal concept of force majeure (or fortuitous event), depen-
dent as it is upon the inadequate identification of fault with emphasis
on evitability (more precisely, on the violation of the "duty to do
everything possible" or "to adopt all suitable means" in order to avoid
the damage), cannot serve as the discriminating criterion for the many
forms of liability, subjective or objective, nor for the views concern-
ing a distinct liability, in this sense.
The same notions that are found in the contemporary classifica-
tion of "subjective" and "objective" cannot, nor could not, maintain
a precise consistency, as demonstrated by the almost incredible doc-
trinal oscillations in this area. We can exclude the concept of evitability
(considered in and of itself) which affects fault, as is apparent in the
interest of a distinction based on the presence or absence of fault
(or dolus) as the foundation of liability. That is to say, one must
distinguish between the illicit type (characterized by culpability) and
the various classes of liability that omit any consideration of culpabili-
ty, these, being what are called "the types of strict liability."
The concept of strict liability is completely disentangled from the
problematic within the traditional doctrine of liability. It is obvious
that, if the principle of fault (culpa) is central to the "violation of the
general duty of diligence" (or, more broadly, the "general duty not
to cause harm to another"), the application of a similar criterion (which,
as a practical matter, is found in the field of causality, at least in
the causation of the act itself) can very well be extended to all of
the types of strict liability, that is, it can also be extended to those
types where it is recognized that the concept of the "act itself" is
amplified within the juridical (or economic) sphere, which furnishes
the causal element of the damage. But doctrine, which defines fault
as a simple "psychological nexus," also arrives at the same conclu-
sions, thus implying that there is an identification of the subject of
culpability with that of causality (causality with regard to an act of
free will), when the essence of that "psychological content" of the no-
tion of fault is not characterized in precise terms and, above all, when
the function of fault in the mechanism of liability is not precisely clear.
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It seems evident, therefore, as Maiorca concludes,39 that the con-
cept of strict liability is distinct from the concept of "liability for the
illicit," emphasizing the areas of investigation in a manner more
rigorous than those of the traditional distinction between "subjective
liability" and "objective liability." One can thus define this legal view-
point as the recognition of a burden on a non-culpable individual who
has the task of insuring, by requirement of law, a fair (although par-
tial) indemnification for the passive economic consequences of the in-
jury to a thing belonging to another individual as a result of an act
or fact which was the material cause of the injury (damage), through
which it is presumed that the obligated individual has obtained or
attempted to obtain a benefit. All of this is based on the general prin-
ciple of cujus commoda ejus et incommoda and on the disturbance of
the social equilibrium (the social solidarity) caused by the damage.
Common to the principal conceptions of strict liability is the am-
biguity of their terms, which seem to exhaust themselves in the
designation of the reduced importance and negative aspect of those
types of liability that are not founded on considerations of fault.'0 From
this its unsuitability becomes evident, at least in the principal form-
ulations through which a unitary and coherent view of liability is pro-
posed. Also from this results the clear division of the subject into
two parts or branches characterized by very different principles, ac-
cording to a rigid alternative in which it is not difficult to describe
a form of reaction and other repercussions within the traditional con-
ception of fault.
According to Scognamiglio's explanation concerning objective
liability," into which, as a practical matter, strict liability resolves
itself, one can refer to the principal theories, where perhaps the most
prestigious credit is found in the notion of evidence and irrefutable
suggestion, according to which he who by his acts creates the condi-
tions of a risk ought to bear its consequences ("the theory of risk").
It is in this sense that the notion is employed in contemporary doc-
trine, especially in regard to the correlation between the interest of
the individual who acts and the risk that is derived therefrom, in ac-
cordance with the ancient maxim cujus commoda ejus incommoda,
which, however, seems to constitute a criterion too vague and em-
pirical for the determination of liability. 2 On the other hand, another
39. Colpa civile. in VIII ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 533 (1960).
40. See H. REINECKE, OBJECTIVE VERANTWORTUNG IM ZIVILEN DELIKTSRECIIT (1960)
[hereinafter cited as REINECKE]; Forchielli, Jntorno ala responsabilitti senza colpa, 21
RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA CIVILE 1378 et seq. (1967).
41. REINECKE, supra n. 40, at 636-37.
42. See gene-ally JOSSERAND, supra n. 37; J. UNGER, HANDELN AUF EIGENE GEFAHR
(1904); Barassi, Contributo alla teroria della responsabilitd, 118921 RIVISTA ITALIANA PER
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and more exact.opinion is founded on the risk-benefit notion, which
must be applied to anyone who obtains an economic advantage as a
result of the occurrence of the act, but which, on the other hand, is
to a degree capable of translating that damage-causing event in terms
of costs. 3
That solution de-emphasizes the importance of concentrating on
the person in control of the conditions of risk and can more actively
operate on the reduction of the risk, thus constituting, to a maximum
degree, a valid criterion of selection with respect to those activities
which give rise to an individual benefit that is disproportionate to
the damage. In the same sense, one can observe that the element
of risk assumes relevance in regard to those so-called economic ac-
tivities of man, as compared to the biological, or, more precisely, in
regard to business activities in the sense that they constitute the pro-
duct of an economic decision and realize a minimum of continuity
and/or organization. Thus, on this can be constructed the foundation
and limits of all, or the major part, of the types of the so-called objec-
tive liability (principally, liability for the acts of servants or employees,
for damage to things or animals, for the ruin of a building, and for
traffic accidents). This theory, however, is proposed in face of serious
objections to giving legal relevance to that which is represented by
the rationale found in any type of legislation, which is arrived at by
means of legislative compromise. From this its strictest formulation
is derived, which is the most disturbing point of view, as a criterion
by which to find and integrate the suggestions of the socio-economic
reality within the corresponding statutory norms, or beyond those,
but in the same vein, the relied-upon legal norms.
Another more prevalent conception refers to a different aspect-
and effect characteristic of the activity of man, which assumes, again,
a certain intensity in the modern world: "the creation of a danger.""
In this respect, one can observe that, in a series of possible situa-
tions, the true reason for which an individual can be called to respond
LE SCIENCE GUIRIDICHE 62 et seq.; Coviello, La responsabilita senza colpa, 118921 RIVISTIA
ITALIANA PER LE SCIENCE GUIRIDICHE 188 et seq.
43. BARASSI, supra n. 31, at 512 et seq.; R. BIENEFELD, DIE HAFTUNGEN OHNE
VERSCHULDEN 133 et seq. (1933); A. EHRENWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT: TRENDS
TOWARD ENTERPRISE LIABILITY FOR INSURABLE RISK 18 (1951); V. MATAJA, DES RECHT DES
SCHADENSERSATZES VOM STANDPUNKTE DER NATIONALOKONOMIE 57 (1888); G. PACCNIONI,
DEL DELITTI E QUASI DELITTI 211 et seq. (1940) [hereinafter cited as PACCNIONI; TRIMARCBI,
supra n. 34, at 34.
44. M. COMPORTt, ESPosIZIONE AL PERICOLO E RESPONSABILITA CIVILE (1965); J. ESSER,
SCHULDRECHT 933 (2d ed. 1960); G. RINCK, GEFA.HRDUNGSHAFTUNG (1959); M. ROMELIN, DIE
GRONDE DES SCHADENSZURECHUNG 46 et seq. (1896); MOLLER-ERTZBACH, Gerfdhrdung-
shaftung und Gefartragung 119101 ARCHlV FOR DIE CIVILISTISTICHE PRAXIS 309 et seq.
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for damages, even absent fault, must be found in the part which that
individual played in creating the dangerous situation.
Among the many different views concerning the function and
significance of the danger, as giving rise to liability, there prevails
a tendency to describe it in rigorous and restrictive terms by refer-
ring to those activities which, if indeed properly recognized as
legitimate, in quality, and taken as a whole, produce socially useful
results, can be considered dangerous because of the frequency and
gravity of the damage produced, which damage must be compensated
for by the one who took that initiative and who, to a certain degree,
seems better able than anyone else to control the consequences. This
controversial theory, however, cannot overcome the primary objec-
tions concerning the situations immediately preceding and immediately
following the act with regard to causation of the damage and concer-
ning a criterion which, in a certain sense, exceeds the reasons giving
rise to civil liability. Those objections, moreover, question the predeter-
mination of any remedy for the existence of a state of peril for the
purpose of serving as a proper reaction to the damage occasioned.
It can thus be observed that the notion of danger appears vague and
indistinct, with the possibility of, at most, affirming its means in regard
to all acts and facts that have occasioned an injurious result. On the
other hand, if according to preferred opinion one can question the
reference to a special degree of danger-an activity that is particularly
dangerous by its nature and by the methods employed, one can bet-
ter delineate the elements of a specific category of civil liability, which
can later serve as a corresponding legal disposition (for strict liability).
Finally, it suffices to point out briefly those less prevalent views
which are always found very far from the principle of fault and which
propose to derive liability from criteria relating to the other points
of view-and this says it all-with respect to the more limited func-
tion of the possible elements and fundamental motives, among which
are found the normative approaches to the subject. Such is the case
with the theory that is based upon the criterion of "equity," emphasiz-
ing in liability, above all, the means for attaining a division of the
damages among all participants, which results in the best response
to the exigencies of social justice (invoking above all the principle of
"wealth obliged"). 5 Or, there is even the theory according to which
the fundamental criterion of civil liability must be found in the "ends
of prevention": the objective being to dissuade the participants from
engaging in the illicit and damaging behavior, with the means for its
realization being found-and, as it is understood, can only be ade-
45. H. FEITH, HAPTUNG OHNE VERSCHULDEN IM KOMMEDEN RECHT? (1936).
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quately accomplished-in the statutory rules on the subject.46 Final-
ly, the so-called "eclectic" theory maintains that in the system of liabili-
ty one must take into consideration the multiple factors attending its
structure (subjective, objective) or bearing upon its function, and these
must be considered in calculating the different types, and various com-
binations, for the purpose of finding the most satisfactory solution
in each case.7
Finally, in this section we must indicate the relationships between
strict liability and its insurability, which has great importance in the
construction of a system of objective liability. It is necessary, in ef-
fect, that the insurance attribute to each one only damages for a risk
which can be calculated for the legally liable party who is covered
by insurance, is self-insured, or insured by a "retreivable premium
insurance policy." Only this is susceptible of being translated into costs
and compatibly injected into the benefits and losses game. On the
contrary, liability for an atypical and unforeseeable accident can, if,
above all, the damage that occurs is unique, seriously disturb the
economic equilibrium of the liable party, apart from expanding its
beneficial function. While social foreseeability does not operate effi-
ciently for the entire population (as in England), strict liability, pro-
perly constructed, will likewise expand the beneficial function of at-
tributing the damage to the person in a position to face it economically,
without taking into account the fact that the risk becomes the burden
of the injured party, for whom this would be an intolerable general
rule and would cause ultimate damage to families, with repercussions
and damage to society as well."
Thus, the delineation of the foundation of strict liability as distinct
and autonomous with respect to liability for fault justifies the divi-
sion of the field of liability into two parts, where one finds two in-
stitutions having different bases and means of actualization, although
for the most part they have an ultimate goal in common: that of the
reduction of risk. The clear separation between strict liability and
liability for fault could greatly facilitate in giving the latter a character
consistent with its foundation; this signifies, above all, that major con-
sideration must be given to those subjective circumstances that make
it unnecessary for the perpetrator to engage in behavior different from
that which caused or could have caused the damage. Today, on the
other hand, the concept of fault has come to be understood in an ob-
jective sense, including its understanding by the jurisprudence. It is
46. Marton. Versuch eines einheitlichen Systems zivilrechtlicher Haftung, 119361 AR-
CHIV FOR DIE CIVILISTISTICHE PRAxis 41 et seq.
47. W. WILBURG, DIE ELEMENTE DES SCHADENSRECHTS (194?).
48. TRIMARCHI, supra n. 34, at 34-39.
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probable that this distortion of the concept arose in order to satisfy
the need to realize in practice, although with inappropriate devices,
objective liability, and that it was then improperly extended to the
entire field of liability.
The recognition of the existence of a system of objective liability
along with that of liability for fault, as Esser has stated,"9 contradicts
the frequently repeated assertion according to which the norms that
a liability independent from fault-strict liability-dictates would be
exceptional. Those norms would be exceptional, it is said, because they
impose a particularly grave burden on liable parties. And, moreover,
to deny liability for a risk would mean imposing a particularly grave
burden in general, since everything that liable parties are relieved
of is placed upon the injured parties, and vice versa. In the assertion
under criticism, one can see nothing more than the manifestation of
a loss of confidence in a principle whose utility is not completely
understandable.
Theoretically, one could say that objective liability diminishes the
benefit of one's own liability," which would favor an ultimate diffu-
sion of insuring against civil liability, which, in turn, would have the
effect of inducing an insured party to act with less diligence." But,
this thesis is contradicted by its own facts: statistics show how in
certain countries the introduction of obligatory insurance for engag-
ing in certain dangerous activities has never resulted in an increased
number of accidents." And, this can be understood because there are
other factors besides the threat of civil liability which induce prudence:
considerations having a moral or social character - fear of the damage
that may happen to things should they become involved in an acci-
dent, the fact that damage to certain things is practically inevitable,
and fear of the penal sanction when the accident causes damage to
people." One should consider, in addition, the facts that accidents fre-
quently are not caused by fault, but rather by defects in the physical
construction of the thing that causes damage, and that this type of
accident cannot be prevented with the threat of a sanction." On the
other hand, one can consider the liability for risk in a business,
translated in terms of costs through the device of insurance, and thus
49. Strickrodt, Die Zweipurigkeit unseres Haflpflichrechts, 10 JURISTENZEITUNG 129
et seq. (1953).
50. Wahl, Das Verschuldenprinzip in kiiftigen Schadenerstazrechl, in 14
ARBEITSBERICHT DER AKADEMIE FUR DEUTSCHES RECHT 18 (1940).
51. Id. at 20.
52. A. EHRENZWEIG, "FULL AID" INSURANCE FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 9 el seq. (1954).
53. James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57
YALE L. J. 558 et seq. (1947) fhereinafter cited as James].
54. PACCNIOLI, supra n. 43, at 175.
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injected into the benefit-loss scheme, which induces the businessman
to adopt ways for reducing risk, the implied benefit being a reduc-
tion in his premiums.5 To these actions by individual businessmen
is added that of the insurance companies, which invest an appreciable
portion of their own money in campaigns for the prevention of ac-
cidents and for research to find new safety methods." Fihally, one
can consider the fact that liability insurance has been extended to
protecting businesses and those who engage in dangerous activities,
so that a broader recognition of strict liability, liability without fault,
will, with difficulty, bring about its ultimate increase. This could also
happen if strict liability is extended to engaging in ordinary human
activities, although this will never occur."'
SYNTHESIS OF COMPARATIVE LAW
One often reads, as Jean Paul Pierard observes," that fault is
always one of the conditions necessary in order to establish civil liabili-
ty, an assertion which today appears to be very theoretical and needs
to be made more precise. Certainly, in the countries of Roman law,
as well as in those of the common law-and even in the socialist
countries-the principle of fault is the basis of civil liability. There
is, however, a corrective first principle in the so-called objectification
of fault developed by the jurisprudence of all of those countries, where
one can find, also, the sanctioning of a strict liability in the respec-
tive civil codes and, likewise, in their laws and international treaties.
Roman Law Countries
France. The guiding notion of the redactors of the Code Napoleon,
that of "no liability without fault," is enunciated in articles 1382 and
1383, to whose rigidity the jurisprudence has made profound inroads
in arriving at the construction of a system of quasi-objective liability,
actually placing the burden of proving fault on the plaintiff and at-
tributing a presumption of fault to the principal of the agent who
has custody of an inanimate thing, but primarily limited to the safe-
keeping of dangerous things. On the other hand, there are legal pro-
visions which anticipate liability without fault in well-delineated mat-
ters. Article 36 of the Decree of November 30, 1955 establishes in
certain instances the liability for operators of aircraft as a matter
of law. Only fault on the part of the victim can defeat this strict liabili-
55. James, supra. n. 53, at 354 el seq., 561.
56. Id. at 559 et seq.
57. TRIMARCHI, supra n. 34, at 42.
58. J. P. PIERARD, RESI'ONSABILITt CIVILE. ENERGIE ATOMIQUE ET DROIT COMPARE 105
(1963).
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ty. The same is true of the liability imposed on contractors and
operators of common carriers under the Law of June 8, 1941. The
administrative courts acknowledge a liability without fault, which is
not grounded in the provisions of articles 1382 and following of the
Code civil, by recognizing an objective liability for damages caused
by dangerous activities. 9
Spain. A general principle, contained in article 1902 of the C6digo
civil states that "he who by an action or omission causes damage to
another, when there is fault or negligence, is obligated to repair the
damage." This principle and certain other particular situations- those
pertaining to the family, owners and businessmen, and other persons
who ought to answer for the acts of another-constitute a system
much like that established by the Code Napoleon.
Modern doctrine and jurisprudence in Spain exhibit an inclination
toward the theory of objective liability, but without declaring it in
a radical form and without ignoring the variable combinations of fault
in each case. The evolution of our Supreme Court in this respect can
be traced principally by examining the Decision of April 9, 1963. At
times the Court has limited the shifting of the burden of proof in
order to require the perpetrator of the damage to prove that in engag-
ing in his licit acts he exercised all prudence and diligence necessary
to avoid that damage; thus, it can be understood why licit acts are
not only those which conform to law but are also those which are
carried out with diligence, an essential element for the exoneration
from liability. At other times, the Court has extended the require-
ment of diligence in the exercise of legitimate acts and has held that,
even though the person adopted safety measures which conformed
to legal provisions, since those measures did not yield positive results,
the diligence exercised was insufficient and the person should have
foreseen the damage and exercised even greater caution.
As in the French code, article 1905 of the Spanish code states:
"[TJhe possessor of an animal or one who uses it is responsible for
the injuries which it causes, except if it escapes or is lost. The liabili-
ty ceases only in the case when the damage comes from force ma-
jeure or from the fault of the person who suffered the injury." To
establish this liability the plaintiff only has to prove the damage, the
causal nexus, and that the animal was, in the possession of the defen-
dant.or of the one who was using it at the time the damage occurred.
The defendant can only be relieved of liability proving force majeure
or the fault of the injured party. Certainly this is a case of strict
liability, since no excuse can be founded on the fact that the animal
59. Nonenmacher, La responsabilitg dans la domaine de la reparation des sinistres
atomiques, 8 JAHARBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 70 (1959).
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escaped or was lost and since the defendant must prove force ma-
jeure, rather than mere fortuitous event. It is established in article
1907 that "the owner of a building is liable for the damages that result
in the ruin of all or part of it if this occurs by failure to make
necessary repairs." In order to demand indemnification, it is sufficient
for the plaintiff to prove the deterioration, the damage, and the causal
nexus between one or the other, by establishing the legal presump-
tion juris tantum of the fault of the owner. Finally, the liability im-
posed on owners in those cases recognized in article 1908, which is
likewise based on an omission or negligence on the part of those same
persons, who cause the damage, has the character of the presump-
tion juris tantum.
With greater clarity and force, strict liability is established in
special laws. For example, Law 25 of April 29, 1964, concerning nuclear
energy, states: "ITihe operator of a nuclear installation or any other
installation that produces or uses radioactive material, or that uses
devices which can produce ionized radiation, shall be liable for nuclear
damage. This liability shall be strict and shall be limited by the ceil-
ing prescribed by law." Equally clear provisions are found in article
1 of Law 122 of December 24, 1962, which concerns the use and opera-
tion of motor vehicles and which was approved by Decree 362 of March
21, 1968; in article 120 of Law 48 of July 21, 1960, which concerns
air navigation and transportation; and in article 35 of the Hunting
Law of April 4, 1970 and Regulation 25 of March 25, 1971. Lastly,
it is interesting to note the situation in Spain regarding the liability
of the state. The Law Governing the Legal Regime of the Public Ad-
ministration of July 26, 1957 establishes in article 40 the liability of
the administration for injuries that cause actual damages, which are
susceptible of being economically valued and individualized with
respect to a person or group of persons and that are produced when
the administration is acting as such, that is to say, when the damages
are the consequence of the administration's normal or abnormal func-
tioning of the public services or by the adoption of methods not sub-
ject to judicial control. This law, however, as declared in the Decree
of July 5, 1969, does not consecrate objective liability with respect
to the administration."0
Italy. Article 2043 of the Italian Civil Code of 1942 establishes
the general principle of liability having its origin in the fault of the
perpetrator. A particularly important instance of liability without fault
is the one anticipated in paragraph 2 of article 2047, which provides
that "in the event the injured party has not been able to obtain restitu-
60. J. SANTOS BRIZ, LA RESPONSABKLIDAD CIVIL: DERECHO SUSTANTIVO Y DERECHO PRO-
CESAL 622 (2d ed. 1977).
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tion from the person charged with the supervision of a minor, the
judge, considering the economic conditions of the parties, can require
the perpetrator of the damage to pay an equitable indemnification."
Another situation which doctrine has come to denominate as objec-
tive liability involves that of a custodian with respect to the damage
caused by the things in his possession, except when there is proof
of a fortuitous event (art. 2051), which is, after all, a presumption,
this being the same with respect to animals (art. 2052), and with the
ruin of buildings (art. 2053), which presupposes warranty.
With greater scope, the liability for the damage caused by the
operation of motor vehicles is expressed in article 2054. The first
paragraph of that article provides that the driver of a vehicle is
obligated to repair the damage caused to persons or things as a result
of the operation of the vehicle, if there is no proof that he did
everything possible to avoid the damage. In the second paragraph
it is provided that, in the case of a collision between vehicles, it is
presumed, except when proved to the contrary, that each driver equal-
ly concurred to produce the damage to each of the vehicles. Paragraph
3 provides that the owner of the vehicle or someone in his place, the
usufructuary, or the buyer under an agreement with a reservation
of ownership is solidarily liable with the driver if the owner does not
prove that the operation of the vehicle took place against his will.
According to the next paragraph of that article, in all cases the per-
sons indicated in the preceding provisions are liable for damages
derived from vices of construction or defects in maintenance of the
vehicle. Thus, there exists a simple presumption of fault from which
one can be freed only if he proves that he has done everything possi-
ble to avoid the damage.
As to the presumption of fault founded on the maxim id quod
plerumque accidit, that presumption can be rebutted if the individuals
obligated to respond can prove that the damage was not due to a
vice or defect, but to a foreign cause which can be regarded as a
fortuitous event or force majeure. And, the regulation of liability for
engaging in dangerous activities is given in article 2050, which states:
"[H]e who causes damage to another in the pursuit of a dangerous
activity, by its nature or by the nature of the means employed, is
obligated to make reparation, if no proof is presented that he adopted
all means necessary to avoid the damage." Thus, one should not speak
of objective liability, but liability of presumed fault, which represents
exonerating proof through the burden of proving that the means
adopted reasonably exclude, within the limits of normal foreseeabili-
ty, all possibility of damage, being the unforeseeable vis nmjor or for-
tuitous event.
Portugal. The Civil Code of Portugal, promulgated on November
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25, 1967, distinguishes liability for fault derived from illicit acts from
liability for risk, which can be considered as strict liability, in that
no fault exists in its aspect of the absence of diligence, except that,
at the most, the indicated social fault, based on activities, though volun-
tary, licit, and conscientious, are nevertheless susceptible of harming
the rights of another, by reason of which the obligation to indemnify
is imposed upon the one who controls such activities. The following
are regulated as varieties of this liability: that derived from damages
caused by animals (art. 502), accidents caused by motor vehicles (art.
503), and the damage caused by electric or gas plants (art. 509).
Germany. Article 823 of the German Civil Code contains the prin-
ciple of the Verschuldenshaflung or liability founded on the proof of
fault. According to the first paragraph of that article, he who, with
intent or negligence, illegally injures the life, body, liberty, property,
or any other right of another person is obligated with respect to it
to repair the damage caused. The second paragraph provides that the
same obligation is imposed upon anyone who violates a law designed
to protect another person. If, according to the tenor of that law, a
breach is possible, even without fault, the obligation to repair the
damage arises even in the case of fault. In article 826 it is provided
that anyone who, contrary to established custom, causes intentional
damage to another person is obligated to that person to repair the
damage.
The authors of the BGB did not have a clear idea of the Gefanr-
dungshaftung, or the liability of a person who exposes another to a
danger, that is, liability for risk, and the authors did not give it an
adequate place in the legal system by regulating only specific cases."
Doctrine and subsequent legislation by the Federal German Republic
has corrected this deficiency. Thus, one of the principal objectives
of the draft of the proposed reform of the law of indemnification for
damage, published in 1967 by the Federal Ministry of Justice, is
precisely to broaden the scope of liability without fault to include cer-
tain businesses and activities expressly designated as being especial-
ly dangerous.
The only liability without fault regulated in the BGB is that of
the owner of dangerous animals for the damages which they cause,
in accordance with article 833. Subsequently, a number of special laws
have created instances of liability for risk in the operation of: railways
(which were formerly governed by the Law of June 7, 1871), motor
vehicles (Law of July 16, 1957), air navigation (Law of October 22,
1965), plants producing electric or other types of energy (Law of
61. II K. LARENZ, DERECHO DE OBLIGACIONES 662 et seq. (Sp. tran. 1959).
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August 15, 1943), and nuclear energy plants (Atomic Law of December
23, 1959).
Switzerland. This country has taken a middle-of-the-road position
between the laws of France and Germany, being inspired by the Code
Napoleon in basing civil liability on the notion of fault (Swiss Code
of Obligations, art. 41), but making its generality more precise in what
approximates the German theory of casuistry, as well as its "stan-
dard" of established custom.
Strict liability has received in the Swiss Code of Obligations a
more thorough develpment than in the German Civil Code,"' for the
former recognizes various cases of liability with respect to fortuitous
event, which obviously implies the non-existence of fault, at least im-
mediately preceding the damage-causing event. In certain cases, special
laws have clearly established the operation of true objective liability.
This is so in regard to: railroad and steamboat companies (Federal
Law of March 28, 1905), the operation of motor vehicles (article 37
of the corresponding special law), air navigation (article 64 of the cor-
respohding law), companies distributing electricity (article 27 of the
law concerning electric plants), and nuclear installations (Federal Law
of December 23, 1959, concerning the peaceful utilization of atomic
energy).
Common Law Countries
There is a true uniformity within the law of civil liability in the
various English-speaking countries: the United States, England, the
Commonwealth, with the exception of certain regions such as the Cana-
dian Province of Quebec and the state of Louisiana in the United
States, which are governed by codes inspired by French legislation. 3
Despite the differences that do exist among the Roman and Anglo-
Saxon legal systems with respect to sources of law, their fundamen-
tal concepts, and their respective systemization in matters of civil
liability, there is a great similarity among. the basic principles and
their- practical application.
Certainly a jurist from the first group would not find in the se-
cond a treatise on obligations. He would have to study the law of
contracts and the law of torts and familiarize himself with the
nomanclature and technique used in works on those subjects, which
he would not find to correspond exactly with his own system. He
would thus realize that the principal source of the law of torts is that
62. See T. GUHL, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE OBLIGATIONENRECHT 127 et seq. (5th ed. 1956);
I MAZEAUD, MAZEAUD & TUNC, supra n. 7, at No. 388.
63. Bonet Ram6n, supra n. 5, at 140.
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of common law, as opposed to statutory law, which indicates that its
principles were taken for the most part from judicial decisions.
England. Civil liability for an illicit act (tort liability) results from
the violation of an obligation ("a breach of a duty") established primari-
ly by law and being clearly distinct from contractual and quasi-
contractual liability, as well as criminal liability. There is no general
principle of liability, states Salmond," and, as with the criminal law
which consists of a set of precepts that establish special crimes, the
law of civil liability consists of a set of rules that establish the dif-
ferent types of damage.
The first, classic rule is based on the notion of fault, which re-
quires as a condition or prerequisite for tort liability the existence
of an intentional, negligent, or voluntary act or omission of an ab-
solute obligation (strict duty) which results in a damage that is not
considered remote. The concept of reasonableness (the "reasonable
man" or "reasonable conduct") is inseparable from negligence, with
the judge being given ample power to fix its limits. In 1886, however,
there began to develop in England the view that in certain cir-
cumstances the person causing the damage should be liable indepen-
dent from his intent or negligence. This principle is found in the
leading case of Rylands v. Fletcher, which was based upon the follow-
ing facts. The owner of a foundry constructed a resevoir on his pro-
perty. He did not know that in his foundry there was an old mine
pool that connected with a mine located in the neighboring foundry.
The water which accumulated in the resevoir escaped through the
abandoned pool and spilled into the neighboring land thereby causing
damage to that property.
The trial court found the owner of the resevoir to be liable for
the damages caused to the neighboring foundry. Although the ap-
pellate court upheld the decision, it did restrict the scope of the trial
court's holding by indicating that the defendant might not have been
liable if he had limited himself to the "natural use" of his foundry,
the construction of the resevoir not falling into this category. From
this holding, the principle of "absolute liability" made the first inroad
into the doctrine of fault. The designation of "absolute liability,"
however, is, defective in light of Rylands v. Fletcher in regard to the
use of dangerous things for which liability is excluded if the event
occurs as a result of force majeure, which was defined by the court
as an act of natural forces and, in such form, its occurrence is human-
ly impossible to anticipate.
This second rule contained in Rylands v. Fletcher is uniformly ap-
64. W. SALMOND, ON THE LAW OF ToRTS 17 (12th ed. 1957).
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plied whenever conditions' giving rise to the damage unite to form
"an escape of a dangerous substance form the non-natural use of land."
When the victim is an employee or a guest of the defendant, Rylands
v. Fletcher is not applicable. Only members of the public who have
been involuntarily exposed to the danger benefit from absolute liabili-
ty. The third rule is that of res ipsa loquitur, which speaks for itself.
A supervening act gives rise to a prima facie presumption of
negligence on the part of the defendant, except that this is a rebut-
table presumption. This liability, then, cannot be considered objective,
although it does very frequently approximate that concept because
of the impossibility which a defendant often encounters in overcom-
ing the presumption of fault.
The United States. The common law was the basis of the law in
the American colonies (with the exception of Louisiana); however, the
United States Supreme Court has continually recognized the im-
possibility of imposing a federal common law upon the states. Against
the background of the unitary cohesion of English law, the laws of
the particular states in the United States present a mosaic of dif-
ferent concepts, from which it is particularly difficult to extract a
uniform law of liability.
Three principal theories are favored among the American jurisdic-
tions. The first is the classic theory of negligence, a system of liabili-
ty based on the notion of fault. The two others are exceptions to the
first, one being the theory of absolute liability, as contained in Rylands
v. Fletcher, and the other being the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. The theory of absolute liability extracted from the opi-
nions of the judges in Rylands v. Fletcher has been adopted in the
United States by the American Law Institute in its Restatement of
the Law of Torts, but has been limited to "ultra hazardous activities,"
the especially dangerous activities of man which do not appear to be
in current use and imply the necessity of a grave risk of injury to
persons or things despite the exercise of the greatest precautions.
However, this apparent unification seems to be on the verge of cer-
tain collapse, as soon as the courts begin to reject it more frequently.
The concept of "ultra hazardous activity" is based upon the notion
that social utility justifies and can allow a certain activity which would
otherwise qualify as giving rise to fault or negligence. Concerning the
interpretation of the rule of res ipsa loquitur, again there is no
unanimity. In certain states, the presumption of liability is simply
treated as a question for the jury, who can thus, in their discretion,
accept or reject it even though the defendant has not presented any
proof of his lack of negligence. In other jurisdictions, the rule is given
the effect of shifting the burden of proof, thus requiring the defen-
dant to unequivocally prove the absence of fault. The principle general-
ly applied by the American courts reduces the matter to one simple
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question: "Is it more probable than not that the act produced the
damage?" Expert and medical testimony, the utilization and recourse
to statistics, references to tables and charts and to scientific treatises,
etc. often serve to establish the reasonableness of the act.
Socialist Countries
The incidence of Marxist theories in the communist countries
characterize such states as being countries of socialist law. The col-
lectivist concept of state and the nationalization of private enterprise
bear upon the general law of liability and justify its characterization
as a distinct category.
The U.S.S.R. Under Soviet law, as in other legal systems, a distinc-
tion is made between ordinary liability and objective liability. But,
while the common law imposes a strict liability with respect to
unrelated situations and activities, Soviet law attempts to create
general bases for the imposition of liability without fault, that is, the
existence of activities which give rise to an increased extraordinary
danger to anyone who encounters them. 5 In the Russian Civil Code
enacted in 1964, fault is specifically introduced in the general princi-
ple of liability and precludes the exception or defense that the in-
jured party had been seriously negligent (art. 444). Liability for
damages caused by a source of increased danger is established in ar-
ticle 454 in the following terms: "The organization and citizens whose
activity involves increased danger for those in its vicinity (transpor-
tation services, industrial enterprises, construction companies,
automobile owners, etc.) must pay for the damages caused by the
source of increased danger when they are unable to prove that the
damages arose as a consequence of an irresistible force or as the result
of the intent of the victim."
Other Socialist Countries. It would be incorrect to think that the
law of socialist democratic states is actually based only upon soviet
codes. Real differences exist, for example, between the laws of
Hungary, Albania, and Poland. Including certain Eastern countries,
many have preserved to the present time a major part of the legal
dispositions instituted by their former regimes. Such is the case of
Poland whose general law of civil liability is based on the Code of
Obligations of October 27, 1933, insofar as it does not conflict with
the principles of the political system and the goals of the Peoples'
Republic of Poland, this being integrated into Book III of the current
Polish Civil Code of 1964.
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